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Abstract 
Purpose: Although studies have demonstrated the importance of supply chain integration 
(SCI) strategies in improving firm performance, very little is understood about how the 
organizational structure (OS) of focal firms affects the successful implementation SCI 
initiatives across supply chains. Taking into consideration the importance of the oil and gas 
industry, as well as the impact of uncertainties on OS and strategy choices, it is important to 
understand how OS and SCI affect the operational performance of oil and gas supply chains. 
Design/ Approach: Taking a contingency approach and using a global sample of 181 oil and 
gas firms, this study examines the mediating role of internal, customer, and supplier 
integration on the relationship between three main dimensions of OS-the degree of 
centralization, formalization, and hierarchical relationships and operational performance, 
using Structural Equation Modeling. 
Findings:  Findings reveal that OS dimensions negatively impact operational performance. 
Further testing for the mediation found that by increasing SCI, oil and gas supply chains can 
mitigate the negative effect of high centralization, formalization and hierarchical relationship, 
on operational performance. 
Implications: Classifying OS into “structuring” and “structural”, this research provides 
evidence on which of the two has a stronger negative impact on operational performance. 
This is significant since it may be difficult for oil and gas companies to restructure and 
reform their OS.  
Originality/Value: This study examines the impact of OS and SCI on improving the 
operational performance of the oil and gas supply chains. Theoretical and practical 
contributions to the field of operations management and organizational studies are also 
discussed. 
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Structure-integration relationships in Oil and Gas Supply Chains 
1. Introduction 
The traditional post-industrial classification of organizational structures as ‘mechanistic’ or 
‘organic’ has evolved significantly in the last few decades. This can be attributed to emerging 
trends like globalization, outsourcing, unstable market dynamics, and socio-political 
uncertainties (Wilden et al., 2013). Today, there are several definitions of organizational 
structure (OS) across different disciplines, but the general consensus is that OS determines a 
firm’s internal/external relationships, authority, and communication (Huang et al., 2010; 
Spiliotopoulou et al., 2015).  Although theorists have used different typologies to describe the 
dimensions of OS, they can be generally grouped into ‘structural’ or ‘structuring’ dimensions 
(Daft, 2012; Dalton et al., 1980). Structural dimensions are the physical characteristics of an 
organization, such as the size, span of control, and hierarchical arrangement of functions 
(flat/tall) (Koufteros et al., 2007). In contrast, structuring dimensions refer to the policies and 
organizational processes, which encourage or limit the behavior and roles of employees 
(degree of formalization and centralization of tasks) (Thompson, 2011). Studies have shown 
that OS directly affects the performance and competitiveness of organizations and supply 
chains (SCs) (Cosh et al., 2012; Foss et al., 2015), however the relationship is not altogether 
straightforward, because it is contingent on the ‘fit’ between OS, and the operational and 
business strategies adopted (Koufteros et al., 2007; Wilden et al., 2013). 
 
With the emergence of global and interconnected markets and an increase in cross-regional 
collaborations, competition can no longer be viewed as just among different companies, but 
also between SCs (Flynn et al., 2010). During this time companies have focused more on 
their core competencies, outsourcing many of the activities that were once done in-house. 
Recent conceptualizations view SCs as ‘complex adaptive systems’, with path dependent 
outcomes, self-organization, and susceptible to slight changes at individual nodes (Carter et 
al., 2015). In highly complex SCs, the increased level of embeddedness and complementarity 
among SC nodes could significantly affect performance outcomes. Consequently, supply 
chain integration (SCI) has been heralded in theory and practice as an important strategy for 
managing the information asymmetries and uncertainties that arise in complex networks. In 
the extant literature, SCI has been predominantly defined as the degree of strategic 
collaboration and sharing of intra- and inter- organizational processes/routines between 
partners for efficient flows of tangible and intangible resources and more effective and 
synchronized SC processes (Flynn et al., 2010; Frohlich and Westbrook, 2001; Schoenherr 
and Swink, 2012). While there are still on-going debates regarding the degree of integration 
required to optimize performance (if any), studies have shown that SCI generally improves 
operational performance by promoting joint planning, value creation, and problem-solving 
capabilities (Flynn et al., 2010). SCI has been studied quite extensively in the manufacturing 
and service sectors (Nahm et al., 2003), however it has received far less attention in the 
extraction and energy sectors, despite the importance of energy SCs to every industry. 
Oil and gas (O&G) SCs drive global economic development by providing energy and other 
essential inputs required in nearly all production operations. Generally speaking, the O&G 
industry is faced with complex internal and external challenges such as the ongoing political 
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unrest in the Middle East, unstable production capacities, unpredictable lead times due to 
regional supply and global demand, and logistics constraints (Chima, 2011). As offshore 
O&G operations advance into more challenging environments, many O&G SCs are adopting 
more sophisticated and integrated process management systems to improve their performance 
(Yergin, 2011). This includes the use of Enterprise Resource Planning and related 
technologies (ERP), Material Requirement Planning (MRP), Collaborative Planning 
Forecasting and Replenishment (CPFR), and cross-docking logistics, to mention a few. 
However, one of the fundamental arguments in the OS literature is that performance 
improvements are only attainable if organizational strategies “fit” the structures in which they 
are applied (Prajogo et al., 2016). In addition, OS is affected by a number of contingent 
factors, particularly the uncertainties associated to industry dynamics, socio-political factors 
as well as regional and supra-national factors such as powerful multinational companies, 
supra-national bodies like OPEC, and regional O&G policies. 
Although studies have demonstrated the importance of SCI strategies in improving 
communication, collaboration, and information sharing within firms and across their SCs 
(Koh et al., 2008), very little is understood about how the OS of focal firms affects the 
successful implementation SCI initiatives across SCs. Taking into consideration the 
importance of the O&G industry, as well as the impact of uncertainties on OS and strategy 
choices, it is important to understand how OS and SCI affect the operational performance of 
O&G SCs. Using a global sample of 181 O&G firms, this study examines the mediating role 
of internal, supplier, and customer integration on the relationship between three main 
dimensions of OS - the degree of centralization, formalization, and hierarchical relationships 
- and operational performance. Operational performance in the surveyed O&G SCs is 
captured using widely adopted measures of cost, lead-time, quality, and flexibility. These 
measures of have been used in previous studies to capture aspects of strategic (flexibility), 
tactical (lead-time), and operational (quality and cost) performance in supply chains 
(Gunasekaran et al., 2004; Neely et al., 1995).  
 
2. Theory and Hypotheses   
2.1 Supply chain integration 
Although governments and businesses have made great strides in developing alternative 
energy sources, long-term global energy consumption trends show that O&G consumption is 
steadily increasing and will continue to account for a significant portion of the global energy 
mix (BP, 2016). Today, O&G companies scout the globe for high-yielding offshore acreage 
across several new frontiers in the Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean, and deep-water 
blocks off the coast of Africa, Brazil, and Australia (Chima, 2011; Mitchell et al., 2012). 
These exploratory activities present technological, geographical and political challenges 
because unlike their manufacturing counterparts, O&G exploration requires cooperation and 
complementary inputs from National oil companies (NOCs) and privately run international 
oil companies (IOCs) (Mitchell et al., 2012). NOCs primarily act as gatekeepers for national 
O&G reserves, but also participate actively in exploration endeavours upstream. IOCs and 
servicing companies on the other hand, compliment the NOCs with the necessary know-how 
for exploration, refining, and distribution owing to their comparatively advanced technical 
capabilities. Consequently, collaboration between the two in terms of logistics and 
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data/information sharing is critical; however, this could be somewhat difficult to achieve, due 
to slight differences in governance structures, management, and operational objectives in the 
public and private sectors (Chima, 2011; Prajogo et al., 2016; Yergin, 2011). 
In such dynamic environments, specific SCs have to be configured by focal firms for each 
tenured O&G project, and in line with the most recent changes in the external environment 
(Wycisk et al., 2008). Modern theories of supply chain management describe such SCs as 
‘complex adaptive systems’ because they are constantly reconfigured and are managed 
through the co-evolution of interlinked NOCs, IOCs, contractors, and environmental 
contingencies such as consumer market, demand patterns, and institutional and political 
factors (Carter et al., 2015; Choi et al., 2001). In practice, NOC’s key customers could be 
IOCs or local O&G companies (petrochemical and refineries), and their key suppliers could 
be local suppliers, IOCs, or contractors/subcontractors of IOCs. Thus, project performance is 
directly or invariably linked to the degree of SCI between O&G companies and their key 
partners on each project. 
The predominant view on SCI in the extant operations and supply chain management 
literature is that it measures the degree of synchronization of tangible material flow (Frohlich 
and Westbrook 2001, Schoenherr and Swink 2012), intangible information and knowledge 
flows (Spiliotopoulou et al., 2015), and strategic relational flows across a SC (Flynn et al., 
2010; Zhao et al., 2011). SCI is usually pursued either internally across the functional units of 
a focal firm, or externally with relevant tiers of customers and suppliers (Wiengarten et al., 
2015). By developing a framework comprising of five “arcs of integration”, Frohlich and 
Westbrook (2001) demonstrated that high degrees of external integration with customers and 
suppliers results in better SC lead-time, quality, cost, and flexibility. Although there are some 
notable exceptions, other empirical studies on SCI have since validated this claim (see 
Childerhouse and Towill, 2011; Schoenherr and Swink, 2012).  
Internal or cross-functional integration is also critical for complex adaptive SCs operating in 
uncertain industries (Carter et al., 2015).  O&G projects are prone to several interconnected 
elements of risk, which affect all material, information, and strategic interactions 
(Narasimhan and Talluri, 2009; Wiengarten et al., 2015). These risks include financial (e.g. 
costs recovery risks, invoicing/payment risks, lawful levies), technical (e.g. engineering 
design risks; procurement risks, construction, fabrication and installation risks), and 
economical (e.g. enterprise risks, liquidity and settlement risks, economic lifecycle 
management risks) issues, amongst other important risk factors (e.g. commercial, legal, 
fiscal, environmental, technological). Proponents of internal integration in O&G projects 
have argued that it is more efficient to identify and manage the different elements of risk 
concurrently at the supplier selection and contracting phases, with the help of capable cross-
functional teams (Ebrahimi and Shiravi, 2009; Shiravi and Ebrahimi, 2006). However in 
practice, many of these risks are appraised independently in different functional units 
(departments); this increases the tendency to misidentify the overlapping aspects of such 
risks.  Nonetheless, there are mixed findings regarding the impact of SCI on operational 
performance. While most authors have empirically demonstrated the positive impact of SCI 
(Flynn et al., 2010), other studies produced mixed findings (Schoenherr and Swink, 2012) 
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and some have even reported negative relationships, particularly between external integration 
and performance (Koufteros et al., 2010).   
2.2 The structure-strategy-performance interaction: A contingency perspective 
Improving operational performance through SCI is partly dependent on the fit between 
adopted integration strategies and specific operational demands or challenges. External 
integration improves coordination and collaboration among NOCs, IOCs, and contractors by 
fostering effective communication and information sharing. Internal integration, on the other 
hand, enables functional units to develop the capabilities required to adequately identify risks, 
select clients and manage the information asymmetries associated with uncertainty. However, 
according to classical arguments in organizational science, strategies must also match the 
organizational characteristics and structures of involved firms (Mintzberg, 1979).  There are 
several conceptualizations of the dimensions of OS, however despite differences in 
terminologies, they can be broadly categorized as ‘structural dimensions’, such as the level of 
hierarchical relationships in an organization, and ‘structuring dimensions’, such as 
formalization and centralization. Structural dimensions determine the physical structure of 
organizations and ascribe a hierarchical order to the functions within it. Structuring 
dimensions by contrast, dictate the policies and actions adopted to encourage or limit the 
behaviour and roles of employees (Daft, 2012; Dalton et al., 1980).  
 
Generally speaking, structural and structuring dimensions have been used to classify 
organizations as either “organic” or “mechanistic”, viewed as polar extremes with contrasting 
levels of formalization, centralization, number of layers, and horizontal relationships (see 
Daft, 2012). Firms with mechanistic structures have highly centralized authority, formalized 
tasks/routines, and several hierarchical layers. The employees in such firms are mandated to 
act in line with their job descriptions, with minimal cross-functional engagements (Cosh et 
al., 2012; Huang et al., 2010; Koufteros et al., 2007). These organizations typically need tight 
supervision from high-level managers and function under rigid regulations and well-defined 
procedures.  Organic structures on the other hand, have lower levels of centralization, 
formalization, and fewer layers of organizational hierarchy (Ji and Dimitratos, 2013). 
Although previous studies have provided useful insights into the dynamics of mechanistic 
and organic OS, there are still mixed findings regarding the optimal structure for effective 
operational performance based on these broad categorizations (Cosh et al., 2012; Daft, 2012; 
Huang et al., 2010).  
Drawing on the structural contingency theory, OS, strategy (SCI), and context (e.g. 
environment, suppliers, customers) must fit in order to achieve better performance outcomes 
(Csaszar, 2012; Lin and Germain, 2003; Wilden et al., 2013). Thus, rather than taking the 
deterministic logic that O&G firms need a particular structure to implement SCI successfully, 
or assuming that “all cases differ”, this study takes a contingency approach to examine how 
the fit between structure (OS) and strategy (SCI) impacts the performance of O&G SCs 
(Cosh et al., 2012; Germain et al., 2008).  
 
2.3 Centralization and operational performance: The mediating role of SCI  
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Centralization refers to the locus of decision-making in an organizations hierarchy (Claver-
Cortés et al., 2012; Daft, 2012). Organizations are considered centralized when all decision 
making follows a sequential top-down fashion, from higher levels of managerial 
responsibility to lower levels. In decentralized organizations, line managers can delegate 
decision-making responsibilities to subordinates as the need arises (Beheregarai et al., 2014; 
Daugherty et al., 2011). In a sense, centralization refers to the dispersion or concentration of 
decision-making autonomy in a firm (Nahm et al., 2003; Spiliotopoulou et al., 2015). There 
are two main aspects: first, the extent to which employees are free to carry out assigned tasks 
without interruptions from superiors; secondly, the degree to which employees participate in 
decision-making processes (Huang et al., 2010; Ji and Dimitratos, 2013; Koufteros et al., 
2007). With the exception of a few studies (e.g. Lin and Germain, 2003), the main body of 
literature suggests that lower centralization improves organizational performance at 
functional -unit, organizational, and SC levels (Cosh et al., 2012; Daugherty et al., 2011; Foss 
et al., 2015; Huang et al., 2010). The main argument put forward is that low centralization 
encourages communication, improves job satisfaction, and fosters employee creativity and 
intuition (Csaszar, 2012; Huang et al., 2010). This encourages “lateral and vertical” 
communication, and allows ‘expert opinion’ to precede ‘designated authority’ when 
necessary (Daugherty, 2011; Hempel et al., 2012; Ji and Dimitratos, 2013). Experts in such 
organizations may feel a greater sense of empowerment and responsibility, and would more 
likely generate innovative solutions to operational problem as they arise. Accordingly, 
companies with centralized OS tend to have greater communication and information 
asymmetries across functional units and in their collaborations with other firms 
(Spiliotopoulou et al., 2015).  
In relation to operational performance, it has been reported that low centralization improves 
lead-time by reducing the bottlenecks in reporting lines for decision making (Nahm et al., 
2003). It further enables efficient internal communication (Csaszar, 2012; Huang et al., 
2010), and increases employee participation and creativity (Ji and Dimitratos, 2013; 
Koufteros et al., 2007). O&G companies usually have multiple concurrent projects, so they 
sometimes adopt a temporary organizational and financing structure called ‘special purpose 
vehicles’ (SPVs) to distinguish project assets and operating structure from those of the focal 
firm/sponsor, and to enable the financing and assessment of each project based on the 
resource flows they generate (Mitchell et al., 2012; Silvestro and Lustrato, 2014). Therefore it 
is important to empower employees to engage in teamwork both within and outside their firm 
boundaries. However, the bureaucratic structuring of decision making in highly centralized 
firms could reduce the speed and efficiency of resulting SPVs, and impact long-term project 
success (Huang et al., 2010; Wilden et al., 2013). It has also been suggested that low 
centralization increases organizational flexibility, responsiveness, information distribution, 
knowledge gathering, and ability to cope with external uncertainties (Cosh et al., 2012; 
Hempel et al., 2012). In highly centralized structures, line-managers are required to refer the 
smallest operational matters to someone higher up the hierarchy for a final decision, which 
tends to slow down internal processes and the overall operational performance (e.g. lead-
time, flexibility) of other interrelated operational units. Organizations with lower 
centralization on the other hand, improve the deployment and flexibility of operational 
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expertise (Huang et al., 2010), which is important for O&G companies requiring a lot of 
technical knowledge to successfully carry out the projects. 
H1a. Centralization is negatively related to operational performance. 
It is generally agreed that in volatile industries, timely flow of data and information across 
internal departments and teams is required. In highly centralized companies, the negative 
impact of centralized decision-making could be reduced by improving and synchronizing 
internal information sharing capabilities. This enables the generation of knowledge beyond 
departmental boundaries, and encourages managers to make highly informed and integrated 
decisions (Koufteros et al., 2010; Zhao et al., 2011). The close interactions between O&G 
companies and their external partners occur in oilfields and project sites, usually involving 
operational and mid-level management. When operational decisions are highly centralized, 
the efficiency of managers is hampered since they may not be permitted to use their latent 
experience for timely decision-making. A routine breakdown of some drilling equipment, for 
instance, would require the sourcing manager to get approval from other departments and 
supervisors, before orders are made to suppliers. Through supplier integration such processes 
improve, and the efficiency of critical information, material, and relational flows with 
suppliers, which fosters close coordination, cooperation, and communication between 
operational level experts located at different nodes within a SC (Droge, et al., 2012; 
Koufteros et al., 2012). 
Similarly, in such structures, the delivery-time of a specific part to a customer could be 
hindered, if the line level experts are not given authority to have their say and effectively deal 
with customer request. Having a good level of customer integration enables customers to 
contribute directly to the focal company’s strategies by feeding back demand information and 
changing preferences into decision-making processes (Beheregarai et al., 2014). Therefore, 
customer integration helps a focal company to better understand the requirements of all tiers 
of customers in terms of their service requirements, preferences, and policies. This study 
proposes that internal, customer, and supplier integration mediates the adverse impact of 
centralization by improving the material, intangible, and relational flows at strategic and 
operational levels between a focal O&G company and its partners.  
H1b: Internal integration mediates the negative impact of centralization on operational 
performance. 
H1c: Supplier integration mediates the negative impact of centralization on operational 
performance.  
H1d: Customer integration mediates the negative impact of centralization on operational 
performance.  
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2.4 Formalization and operational performance: The mediating role of SCI  
Formalization can be defined as the extent to which employees are given standardized rules, 
regulations, and processes (Daft, 2012; Ingvaldsen, 2015; Liao et al., 2011). It represents the 
degree to which the rules guiding the behaviors and activities of employees are clearly coded 
and documented (Claver-Cortés et al., 2012; Cosh et al., 2012). It is important to distinguish 
between two forms of formalization namely; (1) formalization of routine company practices 
and procedures, and (2) formalization of non-routine practices and procedures (Adler and 
Borys, 1996; Daugherty et al., 2011). There are conflicting arguments regarding the impact of 
both forms of formalization on operational performance. Some argue that if a minimum level 
of formalization does not exist, it could result in role ambiguity (Cosh et al., 2012; Hempel et 
al., 2012; Hirst et al., 2011). Similarly, others have suggested that formalization reduces 
conflicts in routine practices because roles are clearly documented (see Thompson, 2011).   
However a rich stream of literature indicates that highly formalized structure have a negative 
impact on staff motivation, autonomy, innovation and performance (Daugherty, 2011; 
Ingvaldsen, 2015). This is because high formalization could limit individual freedom and the 
discretion needed to carry out tasks in dynamic environments (Koufteros et al., 2007; Wilden 
et al., 2013). In highly formalized organizations, employees may be discouraged from 
actively generating new ideas (Ingvaldsen, 2015; Liao et al., 2011). Likewise, it has been 
suggested that high formalization could also constrain flexibility, communication, and 
employees’ ability to adjust to non-standardized/non-routine job environments (Daugherty et 
al., 2011; Hirst et al., 2011). O&G companies frequently face non-routine challenges (e.g. 
drilling failure or a reservoir leaks), and it is sometimes essential to be able to make speedy 
decisions using informal rules (Hempel et al., 2012). Nevertheless, due to high-risk levels, 
O&G companies are known to implement rigid routines and processes. While there are clear 
benefits of formalized routine processes, the evidence from previous studies overwhelmingly 
supports lower formalization of non-routine processes, particularly in volatile environments.  
H2a: Formalization is negatively related to operational performance.  
Highly formalized OS tend to create greater isolation among senior management, functional 
unit managers, and operational field employees (Ingvaldsen, 2015; Liao et al., 2011). By 
codifying responsibilities and closely supervising individual roles, formalized firms may 
restrict the propensity of operational or mid-level managers to take initiative when faced with 
challenges at offshore locations. It has been noted that internal integration enables the 
development of systematic coordination between departmental functions, which improves 
risk identification and problem-solving (Shiravi and Ebrahimi, 2006). Therefore with high 
internal integration, employees in formalized organizations may be empowered to share 
knowledge through cross-functional interactions, which could mediate the negative impact of 
high formalization on operational performance.  
It has also been argued that highly formalized structures tend to constrain communication and 
trust, and significantly affect the “human-touch” in the relational dynamics between focal 
firms, suppliers and customers (Daugherty, 2011; Hirst et al., 2011; Wilden et al., 2013). 
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Relationships are perhaps the most crucial success factor in the O&G industry due to the 
complicated and highly uncertain nature of operations. Accordingly, supplier and customer 
integration could help focal companies to share operational, financial, and strategic 
knowledge with their partners for mutual benefits (Droge et al., 2012), thus making 
information accessible at different levels of reporting. In other words, information that is 
ordinarily strategic in formalized OS becomes available at operational level. The O&G 
industry is fraught with political, regional, supra-national, and economic uncertainties, 
therefore formalized non-routine policies and procedure could limit the effectiveness of 
operational or mid-level managers in the frontline with clients and suppliers. Internal, 
customer, and supplier integration could thus help O&G companies to better manage 
uncertainties, build relationships, and establish more trust. Even in cases where some degree 
of formalization is required, this study argues that internal, supplier, and customer integration 
serve to counter or mediate the negative impact of high formalization on operational 
performance.  
H2b: Internal integration mediates the negative impact of formalization on operational 
performance.  
H2c: Supplier integration mediates the negative impact of formalization on operational 
performance.  
H2d: Customer integration mediates the negative impact of formalization on operational 
performance.  
 
2.5 Hierarchical relationship and operational performance: The mediating role of SCI  
Hierarchical relationship is the extent to which a firm has a few (flat), or many levels of 
reporting (tall) within its organizational hierarchy (Huang et al., 2010; Ji and Dimitratos, 
2013). In simpler terms, it refers to the number of managing levels in a company’s chain of 
command (Jacobides, 2007; Nahm et al., 2003).  
In taller OS decisions have to pass through several hierarchical layers of management that are 
not directly in the ‘trenches’, which could affect decision quality and lead-time (Huang et al., 
2010; Koufteros et al., 2007). Like formalization and centralization, hierarchical relationship 
could also negatively impact communication, control, and coordination, amongst 
organizational members (Jacobides, 2007; Ji and Dimitratos, 2013; Koufteros et al., 2007). 
This is because with more layers of hierarchy, communication channels become complex and 
the quality of feedback from supervisors to co-workers is standardized and diminished (Foss 
et al., 2015; Huang et al., 2010). The consequences of a taller OS are more severe in 
uncertain environments where several potential issues need to be resolved collaboratively. In 
tall structures, the aptitude to identify, report, and resolve potential challenges at operational 
level is weakened. For example, a well manager who is more knowledgeable on oil well 
consolidation processes by virtue of his/her role, would need several levels of approval in 
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order to present optimization suggestions to top management.  
H3a. Hierarchical relationship is negatively related to operational performance.  
Having several hierarchical divisions between strategic-level and operational managers could 
obstruct relational, information, and knowledge flows. O&G companies with such structures 
could therefore suffer operational setbacks due to hierarchical and departmental 
bureaucracies. However, with high internal/cross-functional integration, such firms can better 
navigate these hierarchical bureaucracies by using the synergies among functional-units to 
reduce the ‘structural holes’ imposed by several reporting lines (Foss et al., 2015). In O&G 
companies with tall OS, direct interactions between operational-level managers and their 
counterparts are very impersonal and often slow due to several lines of reporting, however 
supplier integration strategies could foster mutual understanding between focal companies 
and key supplier because the transactive memory acquired from previous interactions can be 
readily applied to problem solving. This could serve to counter the effect of multiple 
reporting lines on operational decision-making processes (Huang et al., 2010; Ji and 
Dimitratos, 2013). 
Similarly, high levels of hierarchy also affect the relationship between focal firms and 
customers. For example, when there are changes in customers’ specifications and 
requirements, field experts may often need to pass through multiple levels of departmental 
approval, which could adversely affect project lead-times (Droge et al., 2012; Jacobides, 
2007). However, through high customer integration, different levels of management can 
concurrently access vital/time-sensitive information, thereby improving the problem solving 
capabilities and response time. Thus it is proposed that internal, supplier, and customer 
integration mediates the negative impact of hierarchical relationship on operational 
performance.  
H3b: Internal integration mediates the negative impact of hierarchical relationship on 
operational performance.  
H3c: Supplier integration mediates the negative impact of hierarchical relationship on 
operational performance  
H3d: Customer integration mediates the negative impact of hierarchical relationship on 
operational performance.  
Figure 1 below illustrates the theoretical framework with the direct and mediating hypotheses 
proposed. 
Insert figure1 
 
 
 
 
	 12	
3. Research Methodology 
3.1 Survey design and sample 
The O&G companies surveyed for this study included NOCs, IOCs, contractors, sub-
contractors and other oil servicing companies, which were identified using databases such as 
RIGZONE, Pegasus, O&G Directory Middle East, O&G UK, and also the research teams 
own high-level industrial contacts.  The questionnaire items for all variables were measured 
on a 7-point-likert scale and adapted from key studies on OS and SCI as itemized in 
Appendix A. Pilot studies involving strategic c-level managers (3), supply chain and 
purchasing professionals (4), and project and operations managers (3) were conducted to 
refine the questions. Respondents were subsequently contacted via email with an online, 
25 minutes self-administered survey, reflecting on key O&G projects involving operations 
with key suppliers and customers, between October 2013 and March 2014. A total of 740 
questionnaires were administered to O&G companies across the Middle East, Africa, Europe, 
North America, South America, and Asia. In total, 207 completed questionnaires were 
received and 23 responses were eliminated due to significant incompleteness. A total of 181 
usable responses were received, representing a response rate of about 28%, which is in line 
with survey response rates in previous studies adopting similar approaches (Frohlich, 2002). 
Around 63% of the 181 responses were sampled from databases, while 27% were from 
personal contacts. Given the nature of O&G industry and the limited number of key players 
(oligopoly), convenience sampling was more effective in reaching respondents that may have 
been inaccessible using other sampling approaches requiring formal access to lists of 
populations. Statistically, tests were carried out to ensure that there were no biases related to 
common methods, non-response and other reliability and validity issues. The tests conducted 
showed no significant difference in the t-test of mean scores between early and late 
respondents. Table 1 shows a demographic distribution of the study respondents.   
 
Insert table1 
 
3.2 Measures and control variables 
Centralization was measured in terms of the level of participation (of operational managers) 
in decision-making and hierarchy of authority, and items were adapted from Koufteros et al. 
(2007), Huang et al. (2010) and Liao et al. (2011). Formalization was measured in terms of 
level of job codification and rule observation, and items were adapted from Lee and Grover 
(1999) and Liao et al. (2011). Hierarchical relationship was measured in terms of the degree 
of ‘tallness’ or ‘flatness’ determined by the average span of control. The items used were 
adapted from Nahm et al. (2003), Koufteros et al. (2007), Huang et al. (2010) and 
Turkulainen and Ketokivi (2012). For internal, supplier, and customer integration, the items 
were adopted from Flynn et al. (2010). To measure operational performance, four qualitative 
and process-based measures were explored as a single construct (Gunasekaran et al., 2004; 
Neely et al., 1995). This included qualitative measures of operational cost (ISO, 2001), 
process lead time (Tersine, 1994), process quality (Kim et al., 2012) and process flexibility 
(Sanchez and Perez, 2005). The study controlled for the size of the O&G operations 
measured in terms of the number of suppliers/customers, average sales and operational 
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expenses. While most studies measure size in terms of number of employees, organizational 
size can also be measured in terms of: 1.physical capacity, 2.number of personnel available, 
3.inputs or outputs, and 4.number of discretionary resources available (Kimberly, 1976). 
Since the aim of this study is to understand the impact of OS and SCI on operational 
performance in O&G SCs, size is conceptualized in terms of the scale of operations inputs 
and outputs in the sampled companies. The study also controlled for the region of O&G 
operations to account for the effect of the regional location of upstream O&G resources. 
 
3.3 Analysis 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) was used to analyze the data collected to establish 
causal links among the variables explored. First, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was 
carried out to validate the proposed measurement model using SPSS. Subsequently, a 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted to assess the adequacy and fit of the 
measurement model, after which the structural path model was determined using AMOS 22 
(Byrne, 2013). Preliminary data screening was carried out for outliers, missing variables, 
skewness and kurtosis. The final data sample was sufficiently symmetric and all the variables 
fell within the acceptable range for skewness (-.5 + 5) and kurtosis (>/< +/- 1)(Pallant, 2010).  
 
3.4 Exploratory Factor Analysis    
A total of 68 items (4-centralization, 4-formalization, 4-hierarchical structure, 9-internal 
integration, 11-customer integration, 13-supplier integration, 23-operational performance) 
were subjected to an EFA. The KMO measure of sampling adequacy (0.964) and Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity were also adequate, thus rejecting the null hypotheses that the correlation 
matrix was proportional to an identity matrix (χ2 (2278)=17957.406, P<.001). Subsequently, 
a principal component analysis using Varimax rotation was carried out on the 68 items. 
Varimax rotation was chosen because it maximizes the extent of variance explained by the 
factors, while minimizing the correlation amongst the factors. The communalities for all 
items were above the 0.50 benchmark.  
Using the Kaiser-Guttman criterion to retain components with eigenvalues greater than 1, a 
seven-factor measurement component matrix was extracted, which explained about 83.58% 
of the total variance in the model (Hair et al., 2006). Complimentary scree-plots also 
confirmed the seven-factor structure (Figure 2). As shown in Table 2, the factor loadings for 
all components based on the rotated component matrix were above the theoretical benchmark 
of 0.5 (Hair et al., 2006). 
Insert figure2 
Insert table2 
3.5 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
The overall fit of the seven-factor measurement model was acceptable based on the adequacy 
and cut off criteria by Byrne (2013) of key parsimonious and non-parsimonious fit indices. 
They include; Chi-square (χ2)=3237.482, degrees of freedom (df)=2169, chi-square goodness 
of fit (χ2/df)=1.493, comparative fit index (CFI)=0.942, parsimony comparative fit index 
(PCFI)=0.897, Normed fit index (NFI)=0.843, root mean squared error of approximation 
(RMSEA)=0.052, and PCLOSE=0.154. After the measurement model was identified by 
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constraining an item for each construct to 1, the variance inflation factor (VIF) for all 
construct was within the cut-off point of 10 for multicollinearity (Byrne, 2013).  
 
 
3.5.1 Validity and Reliability 
In testing for convergent validity, the average variance extracted (AVE) for all the constructs 
measured was above the 0.50 benchmark, with the lowest construct having an AVE of 0.874. 
This implies that each construct explains more than half of the variance in their indicators. 
The seven-factor model also met the Fornell–Larcker criterion for discriminant validity (Hair 
et al., 2006). In relation model reliability, the Cronbach’s alphas and composite reliability 
(CR) values for every construct met the acceptable threshold as shown in Table 3 below. 
Insert table3 
 
3.5.2 Common Methods Bias and Measurement Model Invariance Tests 
The single latent factor approach was used to check for possible common methods bias from 
using a single questionnaire for all the variables explored (Podsakoff et al., 2003). The results 
did not indicate a significant difference in the standardized regression weights when the 
common latent factor was added, thus indicating that there was no common methods bias. 
Additionally, metric and configural measurement model invariance tests were conducted to 
examine if the factor structure of the measurement model was consistent for multi-groups 
within the data sample (e.g. Sector=upstream and midstream/downstream; ownership=public, 
and public/private). A non-significant chi-squared difference was obtained for both the 
unconstrained (χ2=19056.6; df=10845) and the fully constrained models for the tested multi-
groups, signifying good metric invariance. In addition, a comparison of the standardized 
regression weights and critical ratios for the differences in regression weights also yielded 
non-significant z scores for all the items at p-value <0.05. The direct and mediation tests were 
conducted independently on the full model while controlling for operational size, and region 
to ensure accuracy and clarity in reporting.  
 
4. Results and Discussion 
Table 4 presents the standardized path coefficients and p-values for the direct relationships 
among the OS variables and operational performance. The results show that, as hypothesised 
in H1a, H2a and H3a, centralization (-.31) formalization (-.197) and hierarchical relationship 
(-0.21) each had a significant negative impact on operational flexibility in terms of cost, 
quality, lead-time and flexibility of O&G SCs. This finding implies that the operational 
performance of O&G SCs is negatively affected where focal companies are highly 
mechanistic in terms of the relative level of participation in decision making (centralization), 
level of job or task codification (formalization), and the span of control for decision making 
(hierarchal relationships). Table 5 reports the mediated path coefficients through internal 
(H1b, H2b, H3b) supplier (H1c, H2c, H3c) and customer integration (H1d, H2d, H3d). 
Findings indicate a significant drop in the path coefficients (β) when the SCI mediators were 
introduced to direct relationships between centralization, formalization, and hierarchical 
relationship, and operational performance. The data was bootstrapped to 2000 samples and 
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the standardized indirect effects for all paths, which measures the strength of the mediation 
was significant at 95% confidence interval (Hayes and Preacher, 2013). As hypothesized, the 
results indicated partial mediation, suggesting that high internal, supplier and customer 
integration between O&G companies and their partners mediates the negative impact of high 
centralization, formalization, and hierarchical relationship on operational performance. The 
overall fit of the hypothesized structural model was adequate (χ2=3398.686, df=2306, 
χ2/df=1.474, CFI=0.941, NFI=0.837, RMSEA=0.051 and PCLOSE=0.277). These findings 
are discussed are further discussed below.  
Insert table4 
Insert table5 
In this study, it was found that centralization, formalization, and hierarchical relationship had 
a significant negative impact on the operational performance of O&G SCs. This could imply 
that highly centralized O&G companies slow down or obstruct communication and 
information flow. For example, if an O&G engineering manager had to refer the smallest 
operational matters to someone higher up the hierarchy, this could diminish the process lead-
time of other departments like procurement and construction.  
As argued, firms with high formalization rely on strict supervision of day-to-day operations. 
In highly volatile operating environments, this constrains flexibility, risk identification, and 
proactive problem solving. Employees in the O&G industry form part of a skilled and 
professional workforce. Their experience, training, and academic-professional qualifications 
usually entitle them to better judgment regarding the non-routine policies/processes that 
affect daily operations. For instance, if a valve problem suddenly occurs at a remote offshore 
location, strict (rigid) supervision and formalized rules may be useful, but could also have 
costly effects when site-commissioning managers strictly adhere to protocol (waiting for 
approval). Such lengthy and formal protocols may affect the entire process quality and lead-
time of the project, and could be costly in terms of damages.  
Likewise, the study reported a negative relationship between hierarchical relationship and 
operational performance. This implies that O&G companies with several layers of hierarchy 
could restrict the aptitude of operational level managers, to identify potential risks and initiate 
process improvements. With a highly skilled workforce, many of the process improvements 
in this industry are adapted from best practice companies or developed locally amongst 
operational experts and approved by top management. Several levels of reporting implies that 
it would be more costly, time consuming and less flexible to adapt best practices and develop 
new practical solutions for approval. For instance, a team of well/drilling managers and 
experts could modify and recommend more effective oil well consolidation practices based 
on their collective experience (e.g. act of drilling from one to multiple wells from a single 
pad). In tall OS, such individuals would need several levels of departmental approvals from 
regional/division heads, before such ideas are presented for consideration and possible 
adoption by senior management. The layers of hierarchy serve to slow down communication 
and coordination, and may even affect the accuracy of reporting when ideas are forced to 
travel through several layers of hierarchy due to tall hierarchical relationships.  
It was found that high internal integration positively mediates the (negative) relationships 
between centralization-operational performance, formalization-operational performance, and 
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hierarchical relationship-operational performance. O&G companies operate in unpredictable 
environments and constantly struggle with several overlapping elements of risks as explained 
earlier. Interdepartmental integration through brainstorming, periodic meetings, and 
collaborative planning using synchronized operating platforms enables the development of 
cross-functional teams within these firms. As such, high internal integration encourages joint 
risk identification, appraisal and mitigation even in highly centralized firms. For instance, in 
order to develop or extend a firms drilling capabilities, high integration through cross 
functional teams would allow operational managers from various relevant sub-units to 
collaboratively develop the most cost-effective solutions and dampen the effect of low 
managerial autonomy imposed by high levels of centralization.  
Likewise, formalization creates isolation among employees as a result of codified 
responsibilities and close supervision. This often hampers the ability of project managers to 
take initiative and proffer solutions as soon as operational problems occur. Also, since most 
projects involve collaborations between NOCs and IOCs working under non-routine policies 
and procedures, high formalization can impose serious constraints on operational 
performance due to the differences in operating policies and governance structures of NOCs 
and IOCs. By adopting internal integration strategies, cross-functional teams are able to learn 
and adapt faster, drawing on a wide assortment of expertise and experience. Tall OS with 
several hierarchical divisions between strategic level and operational managers experience 
obstructions in information flow, and O&G firms with such structures, tend to restrict the 
ability of operational managers to identify and overcome challenges in a timely and cost 
effective manner. To reduce exploration and production costs, many O&G companies today 
source for services from low cost countries like China. While these countries may have the 
required know-how, the risk management requirements are accentuated because firms need to 
ascertain that the quality of the products and services purchased meet the legal, social and 
ethical standards of the industry. Due to the nature of O&G exploration, regulatory 
requirements are prone to constant changes and updates. High internal integration between 
the procurement department and the engineering and technical departments is crucial for 
smooth communication of new standards and procedures. In the absence of strong cross-
functional integration strategies, firms with tall OS would usually wait for longer periods for 
such crucial information to trickle down to operational levels through stacks of bureaucratic 
layers. Internal integration thus serves as a cost-effective by-pass to bureaucracy; the 
alternative being an expensive organizational restructuring.  
High supplier and customer integration was found to positively mediate the (negative) 
relationships between centralization-operational performance, formalization-operational 
performance, and hierarchical relationship-operational performance.  As argued previously in 
O&G companies with high degree of centralization, operational level managers are not given 
the necessary authority to deal with day-to-day challenges effectively. In such structures, 
something as common as a breakdown of routine drilling equipment (e.g. rotary hose and 
water tanks) would require the sourcing manager to get approval from departmental heads 
and supervisors, before orders can be placed to suppliers with adverse consequences on 
process quality and lead-time. One major issue affecting the industry is scarcity of inputs in 
terms of qualified labor, raw materials and metals, rigs, vessels and other services. For 
instance, the demand for steel currently far outweighs the supply in the industry, and it 
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usually attracts a high premium to secure enough steel for new projects. Consequently, 
mismatches between supplier’s lead-time and project lead-time could be very costly.  
In addition, highly centralized O&G firms may lack the flexibility required to alter order lot-
sizes in sync with supplier’s output. However, through customer and supplier integration, 
even highly centralized firms can align their processes and demand to their supplier’s 
capabilities, thus dampening the costly effect of high centralization on lead-time. Through 
effective supplier integration (synchronized-ordering-systems), sourcing managers and their 
external counterpart are better equipped to coordinate and manage processes despite the 
constraints placed by their internal OS.  Similarly when centralization is high, a customer 
service manager may be constrained to effectively deal with the request of several customers 
in a correct and timely fashion. In the O&G industry, there are several nested customers 
within a project (IOCs/NOCs) who may not be the final customers of the project output, but 
may have conflicting requirements and commitments. Some customers may have overlapping 
commitments with other concurrent O&G projects. Customer integration therefore helps the 
focal company to better understand the requirements of all tiers of customers in terms of their 
service requirements, preferences, and policies. Furthermore, O&G companies with 
formalized non-routine policies and procedures restrict operational managers’ from promptly 
reacting to external uncertainty.  
High formalization of non-routine policies and procedure also restricts the efficiency with 
which operational managers handle customer challenges as described earlier.  O&G firms 
with several hierarchical relationships tend to move the locus of decision making further 
away from the operators in an industry where operators may often be required to work 
offshore for months on end. This can have adverse effects on key performance measures like 
cost, quality, lead-time and flexibility, particularly when there are disruptions to normal 
process flow. By implementing supplier integration strategies, mutual understanding is 
fostered between focal companies and key suppliers, and the transactive memory acquired 
from previous interactions can be applied to problem solving by operational experts on both 
sides (e.g. strategic partnership with major supplier). For example, if a drilling failure occurs, 
such companies could react more effectively by including hands-on well and drilling 
managers. Thus, if equipment were requested, the well manager would not need the higher 
departmental approval to interact with supplier. Customer integration can also have a 
dampening effect on the negative consequences of tall OS. If there are sudden alterations to 
customer specifications (supply disruptions or changes in demand), the first individual to 
know of such changes and its implication would be the operational manager dealing directly 
with the clients. With high customer integration, information about such sudden changes 
would be available to all concerned levels within the OS simultaneously, and reduce the 
overall response lead-time for tall OS. Therefore a good level of customer integration 
encourages the development of operational capabilities beyond hierarchical distinctions.  
 
5. Conclusion, implications and future research 
By including insights from the contingency theory, this study developed and validated a 
framework to explain the effect of SCI on OS and performance in O&G SCs. Results of the 
study indicated that as O&G companies develop SCI capabilities, the negative impact of 
highly mechanistic structure on operational performance is diminished. In line with pervious 
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studies, it was found that lower levels of centralization (Cosh et al., 2012; Foss et al., 2015), 
formalization (Daugherty, 2011; Ingvaldsen, 2015, Wilden et al., 2013), and hierarchical 
relationships (Huang et al., 2010; Koufteros et al., 2007) improve organizational 
performance. Contrary to some authors that have argued for more rigid structures (Lin and 
Germain, 2003), this study shows that internal, supplier, and customer integration mediate the 
negative relationship between OS and performance. This resonates with previous studies that 
have used strategies such as SCI as mediators to improve organizational performance (Droge 
et al., 2012; Koufteros et al., 2012). The study contributes directly to the organizational 
literature by clarifying the organic and mechanistic dichotomy and distinguishing between 
the “structuring” and “structural” dimensions of OS, and finding that structuring dimensions 
such as formalization and centralization had a more significant impact on operational 
performance. The study further adds to operations management literature by demonstrating 
the role of internal and external SCI in performance improvement, especially in uncertain and 
volatile operating environments, with significant implications for practitioners. Restructuring 
and reforming rigid OS could be expensive and difficult to implement in practice. However it 
was demonstrated that by investing in internal and external integration strategies, firms can 
mediate the negative impact of highly mechanistic OS structures on their operational 
performance. As inter and intra firm integration and communication improves, mechanistic 
firms can gradually become more organic in their operations without the associated lead-time 
and cost implications of re-structuring the entire organization.  
Although this study offers significant insights, there are some limitations and opportunities 
for future research. First, although findings suggest that integration helps mediate the adverse 
effect of mechanistic OS, it may be useful for future researchers to conduct longitudinal 
studies to monitor the effect of long-term internal and external integration on OS and 
performance. Secondly, it would be interesting to expand the scope of study beyond the O&G 
industry to include other extraction-based industries. Lastly, future studies may examine the 
impact of the interaction effects between the SCI dimensions (internal, customer, and supplier 
integration) on OS (centralization, formalization and hierarchical relationships) and 
operational performance to better understand how each dimension of integration affects the 
performance of other dimension and the overall research framework. 
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Tables: 
 
Table 1. Background characteristics of sample (N=181) 
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Table 2. Rotated Component Matrix  
Factor 
Loadings 
Factor1-
OP 
Factor2-
SI 
Factor3-
CI 
Factor4-
II 
Factor5-
HR 
Factor6-
Form 
Factor7-
Cent 
Ccost1 .816       
Ccost3 .814       
Ocost2 .797       
Ccost5 .789       
Ccost7 .789       
Qlty1 .787       
Ccost4 .781       
Ocost3 .780       
Flex4 .779       
Ocost1 .779       
Ltime2 .778       
Qlty2 .774       
Flex3 .774       
Ccost2 .772       
Ccost6 .770       
Qlty4 .753       
Qlty3 .752       
Ltime1 .751       
Ltime4 .750       
Ocost4 .746       
Flex1 .743       
Ltime3 .724       
Ltime2 .719       
Sintg8  .864      
Sintg4  .852      
Sintg12  .846      
Sintg10  .842      
Sintg5  .840      
Sintg9  .837      
Sintg2  .827      
Sintg11  .825      
Sintg3  .822      
Sintg7  .821      
Sintg6  .815      
Sintg13  .811      
Sintg1  .797      
Cintg7   .845     
Cintg11   .829     
Cintg6   .827     
Cintg5   .826     
Cintg4   .824     
Cintg10   .822     
Cintg8   .816     
Cintg9   .816     
Cintg2   .815     
Cintg3   .782     
Cintg1   .774     
Iintg7    .807    
Iintg9    .792    
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Iintg5    .785    
Iintg2    .784    
Iintg6    .778    
Iintg8    .772    
Iintg1    .767    
Iintg4    .765    
Iintg3    .752    
Hierstr3     -.838   
Hierstr1     -.818   
Hierstr2     -.785   
Hierstr4     .623   
Form2      -.750  
Form1      -.699  
Form3      -.677  
Form4      .662  
Cent3       -.732 
Cent1       -.714 
Cent2       -.703 
Cent4       .549 
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Table 3.Mean values, standard deviations, Composite reliability(CR), Average variance 
extracted(AVE) Cronbach’s alphas(α) and bivariate correlations between study variables 
(diagonal bold numbers=square root of AVE) 
	
CR	 AVE	 α	 Form	 OP	 SI	 CI	 II	 HR	 Cent	
Form	 0.822	 0.815	 0.945	 0.903	 		 		 		 		 		 		
OP	 0.987	 0.764	 0.987	 -0.698	 0.874	 		 		 		 		 		
SI	 0.987	 0.850	 0.986	 -0.614	 0.638	 0.922	 		 		 		 		
CI	 0.982	 0.831	 0.982	 -0.592	 0.655	 0.551	 0.911	 		 		 		
II	 0.980	 0.845	 0.980	 -0.669	 0.686	 0.606	 0.585	 0.919	 		 		
HR	 0.814	 0.798	 0.939	 0.565	 -0.570	 -0.578	 -0.513	 -0.586	 0.893	 		
Cent	 0.797	 0.776	 0.931	 0.618	 -0.724	 -0.585	 -0.587	 -0.664	 0.570	 0.881		
 
Table 4.Relationship OS and OP 
Independent  Path Dependent Standardized path coefficient 
Cent à OP -.313** 
Form à OP -.197** 
HR à OP -.29* 
*Significant at 0.05 level, **Significant at 0.005 level, ***Significant at<0.001   	
 
Table 5.Mediation effect of SCI  
Relationship Direct effect 
without mediator  
Direct effect with 
mediator 
Indirect 
effect 
t-value Bootstrap confidence interval 
 
Upper Lower 
H1b CentàIIàOP -.445*** -.311*** .013**	 -5.169 -.162 -.501 
H1c CentàSIàOP -.445*** -.309*** .013**	 -5.731 
H1d CentàCIàOP -.445*** -.309*** .013**	 -5.646 
H2b FormàIIàOP -.350*** -.190** .007**	 -3.395 -.068 -.351 
H2c FormàSIàOP -.350*** -.188** .007**	 -3.476 
H2d FormàCIàOP -.350*** -.187** .007**	 -3.493 
H3b HRàIIàOP -.120 -.023 .17**	 -0.327 -.126 -.152 
H3c HRàSIàOP -.120 -.022 .17**	 -0.323 
H3d HRàCIàOP -.120 -.021 .17**	 -0.331 
*Significant at 0.05 level, **Significant at 0.005 level, ***Significant at<0.001   				
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Figures:			
	
	
Figure 1: Structural model showing direct effects between OS dimensions and OP, and also 
the mediating role of SCI (II, SI, CI) on the relationship between OS and OP 			
 
                               Figure 2: Scree test  
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Appendix-A Measures  
 
Centralization  
The power to make considerable operational decisions is concentrated in the organization 
Even small operational matters have to be referred to someone higher up the hierarchy for a 
final decision 
Your firm senses that staff would need a great level of control over their responsibilities 
Your company encourages lower level (middle managers) participation in operational 
decision-making process where problems occur 
 
Formalization  
Your firm has formal strategic planning processes, which result in a written mission, long-
range goals and strategies for implementation 
Your company has strategic plans (coded&put in writing) to respond to customer/supplier 
Your firm relies on strict supervision (rules&procedures) in controlling day-to-day operation 
If a written rule does not cover some situation, staff make up informal rules for carrying out 
their tasks 
 
Hierarchical relationship 
A large hierarchical distance exists between operational managers and senior executives 
We have a tall OS 
There are many levels in our organizational chart 
Our organization structure is relatively flat 
 
 
Internal integration  
“Data integration among internal functions”  
“Enterprise application integration among internal functions” 
“Integrative inventory management” 
“Real-time searching of the level of inventory” 
“Real-time searching of logistics-related operating data” 
“The utilization of periodic interdepartmental meetings among internal functions” 
“The use of cross-functional teams in process improvement” 
“The use of cross-functional teams in new product development” 
“Real-time integration and connection among all internal functions from raw material 
management through production, shipping, and sales” 
 
Supplier integration 
“Information exchange with our major supplier through information networks” 
“The establishment of quick ordering systems with our major supplier” 
“Strategic partnership with our major supplier” 
“Stable procurement through network with our major supplier” 
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“The participation level of our major supplier in the process of procurement and production” 
“The participation level of our major supplier in the design stage” 
“Our major supplier shares their production schedule with us” 
“Our major supplier shares their production capacity with us” 
“Our major supplier shares available inventory with us” 
“We share our production plans with our major supplier” 
“We share our demand forecasts with our major supplier” 
“We share our inventory levels with our major supplier” 
“We help our major supplier to improve its process to better meet our needs” 
Customer integration 
“Linkage with our major customer through information networks” 
“Computerization for our major customer’s ordering” 
“Sharing of market information from our major customer” 
“Communication with our major customer” 
“The establishment of quick ordering systems with our major customer” 
“Follow-up with our major customer for feedback” 
“The frequency of period contacts with our major customer” 
“Our major customer shares Point of Sales (POS) information with us” 
“Our major customer shares demand forecast with us” 
“We share our available inventory with our major customer” 
“We share our production plan with our major customer” 
 
Operational performance 
Quality  
Rate the level of your company’s ability in utilizing information/data from quality programs 
Rate the level of your company’s supplier surveys, which indicate the level of qualities set or 
met by your suppliers 
Rate the level of your company’s quality systems, which measure and monitor the standard of 
internal quality 
How well does your quality management practices determine and reduce defective, failed, or 
non-conforming item, during or after inspection 
 
Lead-time 
Rate the level of your company’s order process for supplier selection 
Rate the level of your company’s system/methods for sending orders to suppliers  
Rate the level of your supplier’s delivery ability/speed.  
Rate the level of your company’s adherence to deadlines set by clients.  
 
Flexibility  
Rate the level of your company’s capability to discover alternative suppliers for each of its 
components and raw materials.  
Rate the level of your company’s ability to have access to widespread and alternative 
equipment in different regions.  
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Rate the level of your company’s ability to introduce new/alternative incentive criteria for 
supply of equipment.  
Rate the level of your company’s responsiveness to changes occurring in industry business 
practices  
 
Cost 
Capital cost: 
Rate the level of your company’s design cost  
Rate the level of your company’s equipment costs  
Rate the level of your company’s fabrication costs 
Rate the level of your company’s installations costs  
Rate the level of your company’s commissioning costs 
Rate the level of your company’s insurance spare costs 
Rate the level of your company’s project reinvestment cost 
Operating costs: 
Rate the level of your company’s man-hour costs for each function  
Rate the level of your company’s spare parts costs for each unit  
Rate the level of your company’s energy consumption costs  
Rate the level of your company’s logistics support costs 			
